{"affected":[{"database_specific":{"source":"https://github.com/github/advisory-database/blob/main/advisories/github-reviewed/2026/06/GHSA-h5rg-8p7f-47g2/GHSA-h5rg-8p7f-47g2.json"},"package":{"ecosystem":"crates.io","name":"surrealdb","purl":"pkg:cargo/surrealdb"},"ranges":[{"events":[{"introduced":"0"},{"fixed":"3.1.5"}],"type":"SEMVER"}]}],"aliases":["CVE-2026-63744"],"database_specific":{"cwe_ids":["CWE-918"],"github_reviewed":true,"github_reviewed_at":"2026-06-19T22:10:45Z","nvd_published_at":null,"severity":"MODERATE"},"details":"SurrealDB fetches the JWKS document for a JWT or record access method using a bare `reqwest` client that follows HTTP redirects by default. The network capability check in `core/src/iam/jwks.rs` (`check_capabilities_url`) is applied only to the originally configured URL; redirect targets are not re-validated. An `--allow-net`-permitted JWKS host that returns a `3xx Location` can therefore redirect the request to an address the allowlist was meant to block, resulting in a server-side request forgery (SSRF). The protected `HttpClient` used by `http::*` functions re-checks every redirect hop and was hardened in 3.1.0, but the JWKS fetcher uses its own client and was not covered.\n\n### Impact\n\nWhat an attacker **can** do:\n\n- With the **Owner** role at database level or above (the minimum required to run `DEFINE ACCESS ... TYPE JWT URL` or `TYPE RECORD ... WITH JWT URL`), point an access method at an allowlisted host they control and redirect the server's GET to an otherwise-blocked target — cloud metadata, loopback, internal services — bypassing `--allow-net`/`--deny-net`.\n- Infer the existence and liveness of internal hosts and ports from response-timing differences (bounded by the 1-second fetch timeout).\n\nWhat it **can't** do:\n\n- Read the response: the fetch is blind — the body is only parsed as a JWKS, and a non-JWKS response surfaces as an opaque `InvalidAuth` error. Nothing is returned to the caller.\n- Modify data or affect availability (a single GET request).\n\n### Patches\n\nThe JWKS fetcher now applies a redirect policy that re-validates every redirect target against the configured network capabilities (mirroring `check_capabilities_url`) and caps redirects at `max_http_redirects`.\n\n- Versions prior to 3.1.5 are vulnerable.\n\n### Workarounds\n\n- Restrict the Owner role to trusted operators.\n- Enforce egress filtering at the network layer (block link-local `169.254.0.0/16` and internal ranges) so redirect targets are unreachable regardless of in-process checks.\n- Configure access methods to use only trusted JWKS hosts that do not redirect, or use locally defined keys instead of a remote JWKS.\n\n### References\n\n- [SurrealDB Documentation — Capabilities](https://surrealdb.com/docs/surrealdb/security/capabilities)\n- [SurrealQL Documentation — DEFINE ACCESS](https://surrealdb.com/docs/surrealql/statements/define/access)\n- `fix(iam): prevent SSRF in JWKS fetch by re-validating redirect targets`","id":"GHSA-h5rg-8p7f-47g2","modified":"2026-11-04T02:56:06.882805987Z","published":"2026-06-19T22:10:45Z","references":[{"type":"WEB","url":"https://github.com/surrealdb/surrealdb/security/advisories/GHSA-h5rg-8p7f-47g2"},{"type":"PACKAGE","url":"https://github.com/surrealdb/surrealdb"}],"schema_version":"1.9.0","severity":[{"score":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:C/C:L/I:N/A:N","type":"CVSS_V3"}],"summary":"SurrealDB: SSRF via JWKS URL — Redirect Following in JWT Key Fetch"}