{
  "affected": [
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "categories": [
          "denial-of-service"
        ],
        "cvss": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:L",
        "informational": null,
        "source": "https://github.com/rustsec/advisory-db/blob/osv/crates/RUSTSEC-2026-0432.json"
      },
      "ecosystem_specific": {
        "affected_functions": null,
        "affects": {
          "arch": [],
          "functions": [],
          "os": []
        }
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "crates.io",
        "name": "codeq",
        "purl": "pkg:cargo/codeq"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0.0.0-0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "0.6.3"
            }
          ],
          "type": "SEMVER"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "license": "CC0-1.0"
  },
  "details": "`codeq` is a serialization library whose `Decode` trait reads length-prefixed values. For `String` and `Vec<u8>`, the length-prefixed `Decode` implementations read a 4-byte big-endian length and allocate a buffer of that size **before** reading the payload. Because the declared length is taken straight from the input with no upper bound and no cross-check against the bytes actually available, a tiny input can force an allocation of up to ~4 GiB. Code that decodes untrusted data through `codeq` can therefore be made to spike memory use and be OOM-killed (CWE-400, uncontrolled resource consumption).\n\nThe affected path, in `src/codec/impls/string_impl.rs`:\n\n```rust\nimpl Decode for String {\n    fn decode<R: io::Read>(mut r: R) -> Result<Self, io::Error> {\n        let len = r.read_u32::<BigEndian>()? as usize;\n        let mut buf = vec![0; len];   // allocates `len` bytes up front\n        r.read_exact(&mut buf)?; \n        String::from_utf8(buf).map_err(|e| io::Error::new(io::ErrorKind::InvalidData, e))\n    }\n}\n```\n\nAny code that decodes attacker-controlled bytes through `codeq` can be forcedcto allocate up to ~4 GiB per `decode` call from a 4-byte length prefix. On a service decoding untrusted input this is a cheap denial of service (crash / OOM-kill). The practical severity depends on how the embedding wires `codeq` to untrusted bytes.\n\n## Remediation\n\nFixed in `0.6.3`, which grows the decode buffers as payload bytes actually arrive instead of pre-allocating the full declared length (commit `9f15313`, \"fix: codec: grow decode buffers as payload bytes arrive\"). Upgrade to `codeq >= 0.6.3`.",
  "id": "RUSTSEC-2026-0432",
  "modified": "2026-11-02T11:30:16.809391425Z",
  "published": "2026-10-31T12:00:00Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://crates.io/crates/codeq"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://rustsec.org/advisories/RUSTSEC-2026-0432.html"
    },
    {
      "type": "REPORT",
      "url": "https://github.com/drmingdrmer/codeq/issues/4"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.9.2",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:L",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "`codeq`: decoding untrusted input can allocate memory from an unchecked length prefix (denial of service)"
}