eef-cve-2026-112880

CVSS 2.1 osv_hex
Description

## Summary Improper Neutralization of CRLF Sequences in HTTP Headers ('HTTP Request/Response Splitting') vulnerability in `hackney_http_connect` in benoitc hackney allows HTTP Request Splitting via the value a `proxy_auth_fun` callback returns. After a 407 response from an HTTP CONNECT proxy, `hackney_http_connect:handle_proxy_auth/11` calls the caller's `proxy_auth_fun` with the status code and the response headers and writes the returned binary into the `Proxy-Authorization` line of the CONNECT retry without checking it. A CR, LF or NUL byte in that value adds header lines to the request sent to the proxy. The value is attacker-influenced when the callback derives it from untrusted data, for example from the proxy's challenge headers. Other caller-supplied values on the CONNECT path, such as the target host and the request headers, were already checked for control bytes. This issue affects hackney: from 2.0.0 before 4.9.0. ## Details **1. Challenge.** `hackney_http_connect:do_handshake_with_auth/9` in `src/hackney_http_connect.erl` sends the CONNECT request to the proxy. When the proxy answers 407 and the `proxy_auth_fun` option is set, it hands the status code and the parsed response headers to `hackney_http_connect:handle_proxy_auth/11`. **2. Callback result.** `handle_proxy_auth/11` calls the caller's `proxy_auth_fun` with those two values. On `{ok, AuthHeader}` it removes any existing `Proxy-Authorization` header and appends the binary `<<"Proxy-Authorization: ", AuthHeader/binary>>` to the header list, then retries the handshake with it. **3. Splitting.** The header list is joined with CRLF into the CONNECT request. A CR, LF or NUL byte inside `AuthHeader` therefore ends the `Proxy-Authorization` line early and the rest is sent as further header lines. The target host and the request headers go through control-byte checks on this path; the callback result did not. The fix applies the same `has_ctl_bytes/1` check to it and returns `{error, {proxy_auth_error, invalid_header}}`. ## Impact A party who controls what the application's `proxy_auth_fun` returns, for instance through the challenge headers of a proxy it can influence, can add header lines to the CONNECT request the client sends to its proxy. ## Workarounds Check the value your `proxy_auth_fun` is about to return for CR, LF and NUL bytes and return `{error, Reason}` instead when one is present. The callback runs in the application, so the check can be made there. ## Configurations The client connects through an HTTP CONNECT proxy with the `proxy_auth_fun` option set, and the callback builds its result from data an untrusted party can influence, such as the proxy's 407 challenge headers. Deployments without `proxy_auth_fun`, or whose callback returns a fixed credential, are not affected.

Timeline
Published
unknown
Last Modified
unknown
CVSS Details

CVSS details not available.

Affected Products

No product information available.

Weaknesses (CWE)
References
Linked Vulnerabilities

No linked vulnerabilities found.

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "source": "https://cna.erlef.org/osv/EEF-CVE-2026-112880.json"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Hex",
        "name": "hackney",
        "purl": "pkg:hex/hackney"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "2.0.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "4.9.0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "SEMVER"
        }
      ],
      "versions": [
        "2.0.0",
        "2.0.1",
        "3.0.0",
        "3.0.1",
        "3.0.2",
        "3.0.3",
        "3.1.0",
        "3.1.1",
        "3.1.2",
        "3.2.0",
        "3.2.1",
        "4.0.0",
        "4.0.1",
        "4.0.2",
        "4.0.3",
        "4.1.0",
        "4.2.0",
        "4.2.1",
        "4.2.2",
        "4.2.3",
        "4.3.0",
        "4.4.0",
        "4.4.1",
        "4.4.2",
        "4.4.3",
        "4.4.5",
        "4.5.0",
        "4.5.1",
        "4.5.2",
        "4.6.0",
        "4.6.1",
        "4.7.0",
        "4.7.1",
        "4.7.2",
        "4.7.3",
        "4.7.4",
        "4.8.0",
        "4.8.1",
        "4.8.2",
        "4.8.3",
        "4.8.4",
        "4.8.5",
        "4.8.6",
        "4.8.7"
      ]
    },
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "source": "https://cna.erlef.org/osv/EEF-CVE-2026-112880.json"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "5df5a74a2817d5b12880d217db33253ff1fae1b5"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "5ee7d7d19eba27e774667d472feb1e93a08af7f9"
            }
          ],
          "repo": "https://github.com/benoitc/hackney",
          "type": "GIT"
        }
      ],
      "versions": [
        "4.8.7",
        "4.8.6",
        "4.8.5",
        "4.8.4",
        "4.8.3",
        "4.8.2",
        "4.8.1",
        "4.8.0",
        "4.7.4",
        "4.7.3",
        "4.7.2",
        "4.7.1",
        "4.7.0",
        "4.6.1",
        "4.6.0",
        "4.5.2",
        "4.5.1",
        "4.5.0",
        "4.4.5",
        "4.4.4",
        "4.4.3",
        "4.4.2",
        "4.4.1",
        "4.4.0",
        "4.3.0",
        "4.2.3",
        "4.2.2",
        "4.2.1",
        "4.2.0",
        "4.1.0",
        "4.0.3",
        "4.0.2",
        "4.0.1",
        "4.0.0",
        "3.2.1",
        "3.2.0",
        "3.1.2",
        "3.1.1",
        "3.1.0",
        "3.0.3",
        "3.0.2",
        "3.0.1",
        "2.0.1",
        "2.0.0"
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-112880"
  ],
  "credits": [
    {
      "name": "Daniel Coles",
      "type": "FINDER"
    },
    {
      "name": "Daniel Coles",
      "type": "REPORTER"
    },
    {
      "name": "Benoit Chesneau",
      "type": "REMEDIATION_DEVELOPER"
    },
    {
      "name": "Jonatan Männchen / EEF",
      "type": "COORDINATOR"
    }
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "capec_ids": [
      "CAPEC-105"
    ],
    "cpe_ids": [
      "cpe:2.3:a:benoitc:hackney:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*"
    ],
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-113"
    ]
  },
  "details": "## Summary\n\nImproper Neutralization of CRLF Sequences in HTTP Headers ('HTTP Request/Response Splitting') vulnerability in `hackney_http_connect` in benoitc hackney allows HTTP Request Splitting via the value a `proxy_auth_fun` callback returns. After a 407 response from an HTTP CONNECT proxy, `hackney_http_connect:handle_proxy_auth/11` calls the caller's `proxy_auth_fun` with the status code and the response headers and writes the returned binary into the `Proxy-Authorization` line of the CONNECT retry without checking it. A CR, LF or NUL byte in that value adds header lines to the request sent to the proxy.\n\nThe value is attacker-influenced when the callback derives it from untrusted data, for example from the proxy's challenge headers. Other caller-supplied values on the CONNECT path, such as the target host and the request headers, were already checked for control bytes.\n\nThis issue affects hackney: from 2.0.0 before 4.9.0.\n\n## Details\n\n**1. Challenge.** `hackney_http_connect:do_handshake_with_auth/9` in `src/hackney_http_connect.erl` sends the CONNECT request to the proxy. When the proxy answers 407 and the `proxy_auth_fun` option is set, it hands the status code and the parsed response headers to `hackney_http_connect:handle_proxy_auth/11`.\n\n**2. Callback result.** `handle_proxy_auth/11` calls the caller's `proxy_auth_fun` with those two values. On `{ok, AuthHeader}` it removes any existing `Proxy-Authorization` header and appends the binary `<<\"Proxy-Authorization: \", AuthHeader/binary>>` to the header list, then retries the handshake with it.\n\n**3. Splitting.** The header list is joined with CRLF into the CONNECT request. A CR, LF or NUL byte inside `AuthHeader` therefore ends the `Proxy-Authorization` line early and the rest is sent as further header lines. The target host and the request headers go through control-byte checks on this path; the callback result did not. The fix applies the same `has_ctl_bytes/1` check to it and returns `{error, {proxy_auth_error, invalid_header}}`.\n\n## Impact\n\nA party who controls what the application's `proxy_auth_fun` returns, for instance through the challenge headers of a proxy it can influence, can add header lines to the CONNECT request the client sends to its proxy.\n\n## Workarounds\n\nCheck the value your `proxy_auth_fun` is about to return for CR, LF and NUL bytes and return `{error, Reason}` instead when one is present. The callback runs in the application, so the check can be made there.\n\n## Configurations\n\nThe client connects through an HTTP CONNECT proxy with the `proxy_auth_fun` option set, and the callback builds its result from data an untrusted party can influence, such as the proxy's 407 challenge headers. Deployments without `proxy_auth_fun`, or whose callback returns a fixed credential, are not affected.",
  "id": "EEF-CVE-2026-112880",
  "modified": "2026-10-26T14:00:04.842750062Z",
  "published": "2026-10-26T13:48:46.589Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://github.com/benoitc/hackney/releases/tag/4.9.0"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://cna.erlef.org/cves/CVE-2026-112880.html"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/benoitc/hackney/pull/989"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/benoitc/hackney/commit/5df5a74a2817d5b12880d217db33253ff1fae1b5"
    },
    {
      "type": "FIX",
      "url": "https://github.com/benoitc/hackney/commit/5ee7d7d19eba27e774667d472feb1e93a08af7f9"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://hex.pm/packages/hackney"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.9.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:L/SA:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "CRLF injection in Proxy-Authorization header built from proxy_auth_fun in hackney"
}
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