eef-cve-2026-115693
CVSS 9.1 osv_hex## Summary Improper Certificate Validation vulnerability in `hackney_ssl` in benoitc hackney allows an on-path attacker to impersonate a server pinned to a private certificate authority via a certificate chain that ends in a publicly trusted root. hackney adds `{partial_chain, fun hackney_ssl:partial_chain/1}` to every `verify_peer` configuration. The callback returns any certificate in the peer chain whose public key matches a root in the bundled certifi store as the trust anchor, and OTP honours that callback over the configured `cacerts`. `hackney_ssl:merge_ssl_opts/3` kept the callback when the caller replaced the trust store with `cacerts` or `cacertfile` in `ssl_options`, so a connection pinned to a private CA still accepted any chain that carried a publicly trusted root. The hostname check still applies, so the attacker needs a publicly trusted certificate for the pinned hostname. This issue affects hackney: from 1.24.0 before 4.9.0. ## Details **1. Default trust options.** `hackney_ssl:check_hostname_opts/1` builds the `verify_peer` options for every TLS connection: the certifi `cacerts`, a hostname `verify_fun`, and `{partial_chain, fun hackney_ssl:partial_chain/1}`. The callback walks the peer chain and returns `{trusted_ca, Cert}` for the first certificate whose public key matches a root in the bundled certifi store, which lets OTP accept chains that end in a cross-signed root. **2. Merge keeps the callback.** When the caller passes `ssl_options`, `hackney_ssl:merge_ssl_opts/3` merges them over the defaults with the caller's values winning per key. `cacerts` or `cacertfile` replace the trust store, and a `cacertfile` removes the default `cacerts`, but `partial_chain` has no counterpart in the caller's options and stays. **3. Validation.** OTP consults `partial_chain` before the configured trust store. A peer chain that carries any publicly trusted root therefore gets that root as its trust anchor, and the pinned `cacerts` are never consulted. Only the hostname `verify_fun` still constrains the attacker. ## Impact An attacker positioned between the client and a server pinned to a private CA, holding a publicly trusted certificate for the pinned hostname, can impersonate the server and read or modify the traffic the client sends and receives. ## Workarounds Pass your own `{partial_chain, Fun}` in `ssl_options` alongside `cacerts` or `cacertfile`. A caller-supplied `partial_chain` replaces hackney's in the merge, and a callback that returns `unknown_ca` makes OTP validate against the configured `cacerts` only. ## Configurations The caller passes `cacerts` or `cacertfile` in `ssl_options` to restrict trust to a private CA, without a `partial_chain` of its own. Connections that use hackney's default certifi trust store are not affected.
- Published
- unknown
- Last Modified
- unknown
CVSS details not available.
No product information available.
- https://github.com/benoitc/hackney/pull/978
- https://cna.erlef.org/cves/CVE-2026-115693.html
- https://github.com/benoitc/hackney/releases/tag/4.9.0
- https://github.com/benoitc/hackney/commit/d8a9afcf5c3849904274e2eba1df56c63d1a1a0c
- https://github.com/benoitc/hackney/commit/915eb5737e9c489d8fc22eec8cdae30e9b027be4
- https://hex.pm/packages/hackney
No linked vulnerabilities found.
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"source": "https://cna.erlef.org/osv/EEF-CVE-2026-115693.json"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Hex",
"name": "hackney",
"purl": "pkg:hex/hackney"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "1.24.0"
},
{
"fixed": "4.9.0"
}
],
"type": "SEMVER"
}
],
"versions": [
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"4.0.0",
"4.0.1",
"4.0.2",
"4.0.3",
"4.1.0",
"4.2.0",
"4.2.1",
"4.2.2",
"4.2.3",
"4.3.0",
"4.4.0",
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]
},
{
"database_specific": {
"source": "https://cna.erlef.org/osv/EEF-CVE-2026-115693.json"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "d8a9afcf5c3849904274e2eba1df56c63d1a1a0c"
},
{
"fixed": "915eb5737e9c489d8fc22eec8cdae30e9b027be4"
}
],
"repo": "https://github.com/benoitc/hackney",
"type": "GIT"
}
],
"versions": [
"4.8.6",
"4.8.5",
"4.8.4",
"4.8.3",
"4.8.2",
"4.8.1",
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"2.0.0-beta.1",
"1.25.0",
"1.24.1",
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]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-115693"
],
"credits": [
{
"name": "Martin Karrer",
"type": "FINDER"
},
{
"name": "Martin Karrer",
"type": "REMEDIATION_DEVELOPER"
},
{
"name": "Jonatan Männchen / EEF",
"type": "COORDINATOR"
}
],
"database_specific": {
"capec_ids": [
"CAPEC-94"
],
"cpe_ids": [
"cpe:2.3:a:benoitc:hackney:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*"
],
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-295"
]
},
"details": "## Summary\n\nImproper Certificate Validation vulnerability in `hackney_ssl` in benoitc hackney allows an on-path attacker to impersonate a server pinned to a private certificate authority via a certificate chain that ends in a publicly trusted root. hackney adds `{partial_chain, fun hackney_ssl:partial_chain/1}` to every `verify_peer` configuration. The callback returns any certificate in the peer chain whose public key matches a root in the bundled certifi store as the trust anchor, and OTP honours that callback over the configured `cacerts`. `hackney_ssl:merge_ssl_opts/3` kept the callback when the caller replaced the trust store with `cacerts` or `cacertfile` in `ssl_options`, so a connection pinned to a private CA still accepted any chain that carried a publicly trusted root.\n\nThe hostname check still applies, so the attacker needs a publicly trusted certificate for the pinned hostname.\n\nThis issue affects hackney: from 1.24.0 before 4.9.0.\n\n## Details\n\n**1. Default trust options.** `hackney_ssl:check_hostname_opts/1` builds the `verify_peer` options for every TLS connection: the certifi `cacerts`, a hostname `verify_fun`, and `{partial_chain, fun hackney_ssl:partial_chain/1}`. The callback walks the peer chain and returns `{trusted_ca, Cert}` for the first certificate whose public key matches a root in the bundled certifi store, which lets OTP accept chains that end in a cross-signed root.\n\n**2. Merge keeps the callback.** When the caller passes `ssl_options`, `hackney_ssl:merge_ssl_opts/3` merges them over the defaults with the caller's values winning per key. `cacerts` or `cacertfile` replace the trust store, and a `cacertfile` removes the default `cacerts`, but `partial_chain` has no counterpart in the caller's options and stays.\n\n**3. Validation.** OTP consults `partial_chain` before the configured trust store. A peer chain that carries any publicly trusted root therefore gets that root as its trust anchor, and the pinned `cacerts` are never consulted. Only the hostname `verify_fun` still constrains the attacker.\n\n## Impact\n\nAn attacker positioned between the client and a server pinned to a private CA, holding a publicly trusted certificate for the pinned hostname, can impersonate the server and read or modify the traffic the client sends and receives.\n\n## Workarounds\n\nPass your own `{partial_chain, Fun}` in `ssl_options` alongside `cacerts` or `cacertfile`. A caller-supplied `partial_chain` replaces hackney's in the merge, and a callback that returns `unknown_ca` makes OTP validate against the configured `cacerts` only.\n\n## Configurations\n\nThe caller passes `cacerts` or `cacertfile` in `ssl_options` to restrict trust to a private CA, without a `partial_chain` of its own. Connections that use hackney's default certifi trust store are not affected.",
"id": "EEF-CVE-2026-115693",
"modified": "2026-10-26T14:00:04.842588289Z",
"published": "2026-10-26T13:49:29.374Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/benoitc/hackney/pull/978"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://cna.erlef.org/cves/CVE-2026-115693.html"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://github.com/benoitc/hackney/releases/tag/4.9.0"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/benoitc/hackney/commit/d8a9afcf5c3849904274e2eba1df56c63d1a1a0c"
},
{
"type": "FIX",
"url": "https://github.com/benoitc/hackney/commit/915eb5737e9c489d8fc22eec8cdae30e9b027be4"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://hex.pm/packages/hackney"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.9.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:H/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "Custom cacerts or cacertfile do not restrict trust to the pinned CA in hackney"
}