eef-cve-2026-115700

CVSS 6.9 osv_hex
Description

## Summary Interpretation Conflict vulnerability in `hackney_url` in benoitc hackney allows Server Side Request Forgery via a percent-encoded bracketed IPv6 literal or an IP literal with a trailing dot. A host such as `%5B%3A%3Affff%3A127%2E0%2E0%2E1%5D` (decoding to `[::ffff:127.0.0.1]`) or `127.0.0.1.` is not an IP address to a caller's allowlist built on `uri_string:parse/1` and `inet:parse_address/1`, while hackney connects to the address it denotes. The same applies to a `Location` target when redirects are followed. The IP-literal gate that `hackney_url:normalize/2` applies to a percent-decoded host, added to close the percent-encoded IP bypass of CVE-2026-47076, passes the decoded value to `inet_parse:address/1` as is. The connect path in `hackney_happy:parse_address/1` drops a surrounding bracket pair, and the resolver ignores a trailing dot, so both forms pass the gate and still reach the literal address. Domain names with a trailing dot and unencoded IPv6 literals are not affected. This issue affects hackney: from 4.0.1 before 4.9.0. ## Details **1. The gate.** `hackney_url:normalize/2` in `src/hackney_url.erl` percent-decodes a host that is not already an IP literal and raises `invalid_url_host` when `inet_parse:address/1` accepts the decoded value. This closed the plain percent-encoded IP case. **2. What the connect path accepts.** `hackney_happy:parse_address/1` removes a surrounding `[...]` pair before calling `inet:parse_address/1`, and the resolver treats a trailing dot as the root label. Neither form is accepted by `inet_parse:address/1`, so `[::ffff:127.0.0.1]` and `127.0.0.1.` pass the gate. **3. Result.** A percent-encoded bracketed IPv6 literal such as `%5B%3A%3Affff%3A127%2E0%2E0%2E1%5D`, or an IPv4 literal with a trailing dot, is not an IP address to a caller's check based on `uri_string:parse/1` and `inet:parse_address/1`, but hackney connects to the address it denotes. The same applies to a `Location` target when redirects are followed. The fix strips one bracket pair and one trailing dot in `ip_candidate/1` before the gate. ## Impact An application that checks user-supplied URLs against an IP allowlist before handing them to hackney can be made to request loopback, link-local metadata and private-network addresses that the allowlist rejects when they are written plainly. ## Workarounds Run the allowlist on the host that `hackney_url:normalize/1` returns for the parsed URL, and strip a surrounding bracket pair and a trailing dot from it before the IP check, so the check sees the same address the connect path uses. ## Configurations The application passes URLs that an untrusted party can influence to hackney and relies on its own host allowlist, built on `uri_string:parse/1` or `inet:parse_address/1`, to keep requests away from internal addresses.

Timeline
Published
unknown
Last Modified
unknown
CVSS Details

CVSS details not available.

Affected Products

No product information available.

Weaknesses (CWE)
References
Linked Vulnerabilities

No linked vulnerabilities found.

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "source": "https://cna.erlef.org/osv/EEF-CVE-2026-115700.json"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Hex",
        "name": "hackney",
        "purl": "pkg:hex/hackney"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "4.0.1"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "4.9.0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "SEMVER"
        }
      ],
      "versions": [
        "4.0.1",
        "4.0.2",
        "4.0.3",
        "4.1.0",
        "4.2.0",
        "4.2.1",
        "4.2.2",
        "4.2.3",
        "4.3.0",
        "4.4.0",
        "4.4.1",
        "4.4.2",
        "4.4.3",
        "4.4.5",
        "4.5.0",
        "4.5.1",
        "4.5.2",
        "4.6.0",
        "4.6.1",
        "4.7.0",
        "4.7.1",
        "4.7.2",
        "4.7.3",
        "4.7.4",
        "4.8.0",
        "4.8.1",
        "4.8.2",
        "4.8.3",
        "4.8.4",
        "4.8.5",
        "4.8.6",
        "4.8.7"
      ]
    },
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "source": "https://cna.erlef.org/osv/EEF-CVE-2026-115700.json"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "452620a92ec1da2e6b4862a049a2a4f04b42068f"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "f19561a0b422376348c91537e51377ab7325f4ee"
            }
          ],
          "repo": "https://github.com/benoitc/hackney",
          "type": "GIT"
        }
      ],
      "versions": [
        "4.8.7",
        "4.8.6",
        "4.8.5",
        "4.8.4",
        "4.8.3",
        "4.8.2",
        "4.8.1",
        "4.8.0",
        "4.7.4",
        "4.7.3",
        "4.7.2",
        "4.7.1",
        "4.7.0",
        "4.6.1",
        "4.6.0",
        "4.5.2",
        "4.5.1",
        "4.5.0",
        "4.4.5",
        "4.4.4",
        "4.4.3",
        "4.4.2",
        "4.4.1",
        "4.4.0",
        "4.3.0",
        "4.2.3",
        "4.2.2",
        "4.2.1",
        "4.2.0",
        "4.1.0",
        "4.0.3",
        "4.0.2",
        "4.0.1"
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-115700"
  ],
  "credits": [
    {
      "name": "Eurico Nicacio",
      "type": "FINDER"
    },
    {
      "name": "Eurico Nicacio",
      "type": "REPORTER"
    },
    {
      "name": "Benoit Chesneau",
      "type": "REMEDIATION_DEVELOPER"
    },
    {
      "name": "Jonatan Männchen / EEF",
      "type": "COORDINATOR"
    }
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "capec_ids": [
      "CAPEC-664"
    ],
    "cpe_ids": [
      "cpe:2.3:a:benoitc:hackney:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*"
    ],
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-436",
      "CWE-918"
    ]
  },
  "details": "## Summary\n\nInterpretation Conflict vulnerability in `hackney_url` in benoitc hackney allows Server Side Request Forgery via a percent-encoded bracketed IPv6 literal or an IP literal with a trailing dot. A host such as `%5B%3A%3Affff%3A127%2E0%2E0%2E1%5D` (decoding to `[::ffff:127.0.0.1]`) or `127.0.0.1.` is not an IP address to a caller's allowlist built on `uri_string:parse/1` and `inet:parse_address/1`, while hackney connects to the address it denotes. The same applies to a `Location` target when redirects are followed.\n\nThe IP-literal gate that `hackney_url:normalize/2` applies to a percent-decoded host, added to close the percent-encoded IP bypass of CVE-2026-47076, passes the decoded value to `inet_parse:address/1` as is. The connect path in `hackney_happy:parse_address/1` drops a surrounding bracket pair, and the resolver ignores a trailing dot, so both forms pass the gate and still reach the literal address. Domain names with a trailing dot and unencoded IPv6 literals are not affected.\n\nThis issue affects hackney: from 4.0.1 before 4.9.0.\n\n## Details\n\n**1. The gate.** `hackney_url:normalize/2` in `src/hackney_url.erl` percent-decodes a host that is not already an IP literal and raises `invalid_url_host` when `inet_parse:address/1` accepts the decoded value. This closed the plain percent-encoded IP case.\n\n**2. What the connect path accepts.** `hackney_happy:parse_address/1` removes a surrounding `[...]` pair before calling `inet:parse_address/1`, and the resolver treats a trailing dot as the root label. Neither form is accepted by `inet_parse:address/1`, so `[::ffff:127.0.0.1]` and `127.0.0.1.` pass the gate.\n\n**3. Result.** A percent-encoded bracketed IPv6 literal such as `%5B%3A%3Affff%3A127%2E0%2E0%2E1%5D`, or an IPv4 literal with a trailing dot, is not an IP address to a caller's check based on `uri_string:parse/1` and `inet:parse_address/1`, but hackney connects to the address it denotes. The same applies to a `Location` target when redirects are followed. The fix strips one bracket pair and one trailing dot in `ip_candidate/1` before the gate.\n\n## Impact\n\nAn application that checks user-supplied URLs against an IP allowlist before handing them to hackney can be made to request loopback, link-local metadata and private-network addresses that the allowlist rejects when they are written plainly.\n\n## Workarounds\n\nRun the allowlist on the host that `hackney_url:normalize/1` returns for the parsed URL, and strip a surrounding bracket pair and a trailing dot from it before the IP check, so the check sees the same address the connect path uses.\n\n## Configurations\n\nThe application passes URLs that an untrusted party can influence to hackney and relies on its own host allowlist, built on `uri_string:parse/1` or `inet:parse_address/1`, to keep requests away from internal addresses.",
  "id": "EEF-CVE-2026-115700",
  "modified": "2026-10-26T14:00:04.842678043Z",
  "published": "2026-10-26T13:49:02.744Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://github.com/benoitc/hackney/releases/tag/4.9.0"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://cna.erlef.org/cves/CVE-2026-115700.html"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/benoitc/hackney/pull/987"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/benoitc/hackney/commit/452620a92ec1da2e6b4862a049a2a4f04b42068f"
    },
    {
      "type": "FIX",
      "url": "https://github.com/benoitc/hackney/commit/f19561a0b422376348c91537e51377ab7325f4ee"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://hex.pm/packages/hackney"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.9.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:H/SI:N/SA:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "SSRF allowlist bypass via percent-encoded bracketed IPv6 or trailing-dot IP literal in hackney"
}
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