eef-cve-2026-65632
CVSS 5.1 osv_hex## Summary The `jose` library accepts ECDSA (ES256, ES256K, ES384, and ES512) JWS signatures of a non-canonical length. When verifying an ECDSA signature, `jose_jwk_kty_ec:verify/4` in `src/jwk/jose_jwk_kty_ec.erl` splits the raw signature in half by its actual byte length (`split_binary(Signature, byte_size(Signature) div 2)`) instead of enforcing the fixed length required by RFC 7518 §3.4, and then decodes each half with `crypto:bytes_to_integer/1`, which ignores leading zero bytes. As a result, an attacker who holds one valid token can prepend leading zero bytes to each of the R and S halves to produce longer signatures that still split evenly and decode to the same `(r, s)` pair, so many distinct signature byte strings all verify against the same key (signature malleability). This does not allow forging new payloads or impersonating a signer, because the underlying `(r, s)` values are unchanged. It does defeat any security control that assumes a valid token or its signature is unique, such as token-revocation-by-hash, replay or idempotency caches, and deduplication logic. This issue affects jose: from 1.0.0 before 1.11.13.
- Published
- unknown
- Last Modified
- unknown
CVSS details not available.
No product information available.
- https://github.com/potatosalad/erlang-jose/security/advisories/GHSA-44hw-rpw9-mwg4
- https://cna.erlef.org/cves/CVE-2026-65632.html
- https://github.com/potatosalad/erlang-jose/commit/a7746ecd4950f85a393136e449a91dac62b5c429
- https://github.com/potatosalad/erlang-jose/commit/72ce1866622b9329347dc52a94173ac0317bc9cf
- https://hex.pm/packages/jose
No linked vulnerabilities found.
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"source": "https://cna.erlef.org/osv/EEF-CVE-2026-65632.json"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Hex",
"name": "jose",
"purl": "pkg:hex/jose"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "1.0.0"
},
{
"fixed": "1.11.13"
}
],
"type": "SEMVER"
}
],
"versions": [
"1.0.0",
"1.0.1",
"1.1.0",
"1.1.1",
"1.1.2",
"1.1.3",
"1.10.0",
"1.10.1",
"1.11.0",
"1.11.1",
"1.11.10",
"1.11.11",
"1.11.12",
"1.11.2",
"1.11.4",
"1.11.5",
"1.11.6",
"1.11.7",
"1.11.8",
"1.11.9",
"1.2.0",
"1.3.0",
"1.4.0",
"1.4.1",
"1.4.2",
"1.5.0",
"1.5.1",
"1.5.2",
"1.6.0",
"1.6.1",
"1.7.0",
"1.7.1",
"1.7.2",
"1.7.3",
"1.7.4",
"1.7.5",
"1.7.6",
"1.7.7",
"1.7.8",
"1.7.9",
"1.8.0",
"1.8.1",
"1.8.2",
"1.8.3",
"1.8.4",
"1.9.0"
]
},
{
"database_specific": {
"source": "https://cna.erlef.org/osv/EEF-CVE-2026-65632.json"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "a7746ecd4950f85a393136e449a91dac62b5c429"
},
{
"fixed": "72ce1866622b9329347dc52a94173ac0317bc9cf"
}
],
"repo": "https://github.com/potatosalad/erlang-jose",
"type": "GIT"
}
],
"versions": [
"1.11.12",
"1.11.11",
"1.11.10",
"1.11.9",
"1.11.8",
"1.11.7",
"1.11.5",
"1.11.4",
"1.11.2",
"1.11.1",
"1.11.0",
"1.10.1",
"1.10.0",
"1.9.0",
"1.8.4",
"1.8.3",
"1.8.2",
"1.8.1",
"1.8.0",
"1.7.9",
"1.7.8",
"1.7.7",
"1.7.6",
"1.7.5",
"1.7.4",
"1.7.3",
"1.7.2",
"1.7.1",
"1.7.0",
"1.6.1",
"1.6.0",
"1.5.2",
"1.5.1",
"1.5.0",
"1.4.2",
"1.4.1",
"1.4.0",
"1.3.0",
"1.2.0",
"1.1.3",
"1.1.2",
"1.1.1",
"1.1.0",
"1.0.1",
"1.0.0"
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-65632",
"GHSA-44hw-rpw9-mwg4"
],
"credits": [
{
"name": "Peter Ullrich",
"type": "REPORTER"
},
{
"name": "Andrew Bennett",
"type": "REMEDIATION_DEVELOPER"
},
{
"name": "Jonatan Männchen / EEF",
"type": "ANALYST"
}
],
"database_specific": {
"capec_ids": [
"CAPEC-475"
],
"cpe_ids": [
"cpe:2.3:a:potatosalad:jose:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*"
],
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-347"
]
},
"details": "## Summary\n\nThe `jose` library accepts ECDSA (ES256, ES256K, ES384, and ES512) JWS signatures of a non-canonical length. When verifying an ECDSA signature, `jose_jwk_kty_ec:verify/4` in `src/jwk/jose_jwk_kty_ec.erl` splits the raw signature in half by its actual byte length (`split_binary(Signature, byte_size(Signature) div 2)`) instead of enforcing the fixed length required by RFC 7518 §3.4, and then decodes each half with `crypto:bytes_to_integer/1`, which ignores leading zero bytes.\n\nAs a result, an attacker who holds one valid token can prepend leading zero bytes to each of the R and S halves to produce longer signatures that still split evenly and decode to the same `(r, s)` pair, so many distinct signature byte strings all verify against the same key (signature malleability). This does not allow forging new payloads or impersonating a signer, because the underlying `(r, s)` values are unchanged. It does defeat any security control that assumes a valid token or its signature is unique, such as token-revocation-by-hash, replay or idempotency caches, and deduplication logic.\n\nThis issue affects jose: from 1.0.0 before 1.11.13.",
"id": "EEF-CVE-2026-65632",
"modified": "2026-10-26T20:11:07.849428784Z",
"published": "2026-10-26T19:53:56.649Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://github.com/potatosalad/erlang-jose/security/advisories/GHSA-44hw-rpw9-mwg4"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://cna.erlef.org/cves/CVE-2026-65632.html"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/potatosalad/erlang-jose/commit/a7746ecd4950f85a393136e449a91dac62b5c429"
},
{
"type": "FIX",
"url": "https://github.com/potatosalad/erlang-jose/commit/72ce1866622b9329347dc52a94173ac0317bc9cf"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://hex.pm/packages/jose"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.9.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "ECDSA signature length is not validated in jose, allowing signature malleability"
}