ghsa-c8jx-96c9-8xrp
CVSS 4.3 osv_rustsecA record user could learn the value of a hidden field by counting how many records match a guess. When `DEFINE FIELD ... PERMISSIONS FOR select WHERE ...` hides a field's contents from a caller, and that field is indexed, running `SELECT count() FROM t WHERE hidden_field = "guess" GROUP ALL` returned a count greater than zero whenever a record actually had that value — even though the caller was never allowed to read the field directly. The query planner used an indexed-COUNT shortcut (`Index::Count`, `IndexCountScan`, or the legacy `Iterate Index Count` / `Iterate Index Keys` paths) that counts matching index entries and skips the permission check that would normally hide the value. The same query with `WITH NOINDEX` correctly returned `[]`, confirming the gap. By repeating the count query with different guesses, an attacker can confirm or recover the contents of any restricted field they could not read through a normal `SELECT`. ### Impact What an attacker **can** do: - Confirm or recover values of a field protected by field-level SELECT permissions on any table they hold table-level SELECT on, provided the field is indexed. - Repeat the query with different guesses to read restricted field contents one value at a time. What it **can't** do: - Read fields that are not indexed (the shortcut only fires when an index covers the predicate column). - Cross table, database or namespace isolation boundaries. - Modify data, escalate privileges, or affect availability. ### Patches The legacy planner (`surrealdb/core/src/idx/planner/tree.rs`) and the streaming planner (`surrealdb/core/src/exec/planner/select/mod.rs`) now both refuse the indexed fast path when the WHERE / ORDER tree references a field governed by a non-`Full` SELECT permission: - `resolve_indexes` skips any B-tree / unique index whose columns are governed by such a permission. - A new `cond_touches_restricted_field` flag is propagated; `eval_count` refuses a dedicated `Index::Count` when set. - The streaming planner adds `cond_touches_restricted_select_field`, a `RestrictedIdiomChecker` visitor that matches each idiom against the table's field-permission prefixes (loaded via the plan-time txn), and gates `IndexCountScan` emission on it. - The fast paths are preserved for root / owner sessions via `should_check_perms_for_view`. Versions 3.1.0 and later are not affected. ### Workarounds Users unable to patch are advised to consider the following workarounds: - Avoid `DEFINE INDEX` on fields whose values are protected by field-level SELECT permissions. The class of attack is specific to the indexed fast paths. - Restrict the ability of record users to issue arbitrary `SELECT count() … GROUP ALL` queries against tables containing field-protected columns. - Use namespace / database isolation as the primary boundary where feasible.
- Published
- unknown
- Last Modified
- unknown
CVSS details not available.
No product information available.
No linked vulnerabilities found.
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"source": "https://github.com/github/advisory-database/blob/main/advisories/github-reviewed/2026/07/GHSA-c8jx-96c9-8xrp/GHSA-c8jx-96c9-8xrp.json"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "crates.io",
"name": "surrealdb",
"purl": "pkg:cargo/surrealdb"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "3.1.0"
}
],
"type": "SEMVER"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-63742"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-863"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-07-01T20:22:06Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "A record user could learn the value of a hidden field by counting how many records match a guess.\n\nWhen `DEFINE FIELD ... PERMISSIONS FOR select WHERE ...` hides a field's contents from a caller, and that field is indexed, running `SELECT count() FROM t WHERE hidden_field = \"guess\" GROUP ALL` returned a count greater than zero whenever a record actually had that value — even though the caller was never allowed to read the field directly. The query planner used an indexed-COUNT shortcut (`Index::Count`, `IndexCountScan`, or the legacy `Iterate Index Count` / `Iterate Index Keys` paths) that counts matching index entries and skips the permission check that would normally hide the value. The same query with `WITH NOINDEX` correctly returned `[]`, confirming the gap.\n\nBy repeating the count query with different guesses, an attacker can confirm or recover the contents of any restricted field they could not read through a normal `SELECT`.\n\n### Impact\n\nWhat an attacker **can** do:\n\n- Confirm or recover values of a field protected by field-level SELECT permissions on any table they hold table-level SELECT on, provided the field is indexed.\n- Repeat the query with different guesses to read restricted field contents one value at a time.\n\nWhat it **can't** do:\n\n- Read fields that are not indexed (the shortcut only fires when an index covers the predicate column).\n- Cross table, database or namespace isolation boundaries.\n- Modify data, escalate privileges, or affect availability.\n\n### Patches\n\nThe legacy planner (`surrealdb/core/src/idx/planner/tree.rs`) and the streaming planner (`surrealdb/core/src/exec/planner/select/mod.rs`) now both refuse the indexed fast path when the WHERE / ORDER tree references a field governed by a non-`Full` SELECT permission:\n\n- `resolve_indexes` skips any B-tree / unique index whose columns are governed by such a permission.\n- A new `cond_touches_restricted_field` flag is propagated; `eval_count` refuses a dedicated `Index::Count` when set.\n- The streaming planner adds `cond_touches_restricted_select_field`, a `RestrictedIdiomChecker` visitor that matches each idiom against the table's field-permission prefixes (loaded via the plan-time txn), and gates `IndexCountScan` emission on it.\n- The fast paths are preserved for root / owner sessions via `should_check_perms_for_view`.\n\nVersions 3.1.0 and later are not affected.\n\n### Workarounds\n\nUsers unable to patch are advised to consider the following workarounds:\n\n- Avoid `DEFINE INDEX` on fields whose values are protected by field-level SELECT permissions. The class of attack is specific to the indexed fast paths.\n- Restrict the ability of record users to issue arbitrary `SELECT count() … GROUP ALL` queries against tables containing field-protected columns.\n- Use namespace / database isolation as the primary boundary where feasible.",
"id": "GHSA-c8jx-96c9-8xrp",
"modified": "2026-11-04T02:56:13.128405465Z",
"published": "2026-07-01T20:22:06Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/surrealdb/surrealdb/security/advisories/GHSA-c8jx-96c9-8xrp"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/surrealdb/surrealdb/pull/240"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/surrealdb/surrealdb/commit/0c6dd021bb55b32a78a553c72bb9c0cdd414825f"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/surrealdb/surrealdb"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.9.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "SurrealDB: Field-level SELECT permissions bypassed via indexed COUNT fast paths"
}