ghsa-c8jx-96c9-8xrp

CVSS 4.3 osv_rustsec
Description

A record user could learn the value of a hidden field by counting how many records match a guess. When `DEFINE FIELD ... PERMISSIONS FOR select WHERE ...` hides a field's contents from a caller, and that field is indexed, running `SELECT count() FROM t WHERE hidden_field = "guess" GROUP ALL` returned a count greater than zero whenever a record actually had that value — even though the caller was never allowed to read the field directly. The query planner used an indexed-COUNT shortcut (`Index::Count`, `IndexCountScan`, or the legacy `Iterate Index Count` / `Iterate Index Keys` paths) that counts matching index entries and skips the permission check that would normally hide the value. The same query with `WITH NOINDEX` correctly returned `[]`, confirming the gap. By repeating the count query with different guesses, an attacker can confirm or recover the contents of any restricted field they could not read through a normal `SELECT`. ### Impact What an attacker **can** do: - Confirm or recover values of a field protected by field-level SELECT permissions on any table they hold table-level SELECT on, provided the field is indexed. - Repeat the query with different guesses to read restricted field contents one value at a time. What it **can't** do: - Read fields that are not indexed (the shortcut only fires when an index covers the predicate column). - Cross table, database or namespace isolation boundaries. - Modify data, escalate privileges, or affect availability. ### Patches The legacy planner (`surrealdb/core/src/idx/planner/tree.rs`) and the streaming planner (`surrealdb/core/src/exec/planner/select/mod.rs`) now both refuse the indexed fast path when the WHERE / ORDER tree references a field governed by a non-`Full` SELECT permission: - `resolve_indexes` skips any B-tree / unique index whose columns are governed by such a permission. - A new `cond_touches_restricted_field` flag is propagated; `eval_count` refuses a dedicated `Index::Count` when set. - The streaming planner adds `cond_touches_restricted_select_field`, a `RestrictedIdiomChecker` visitor that matches each idiom against the table's field-permission prefixes (loaded via the plan-time txn), and gates `IndexCountScan` emission on it. - The fast paths are preserved for root / owner sessions via `should_check_perms_for_view`. Versions 3.1.0 and later are not affected. ### Workarounds Users unable to patch are advised to consider the following workarounds: - Avoid `DEFINE INDEX` on fields whose values are protected by field-level SELECT permissions. The class of attack is specific to the indexed fast paths. - Restrict the ability of record users to issue arbitrary `SELECT count() … GROUP ALL` queries against tables containing field-protected columns. - Use namespace / database isolation as the primary boundary where feasible.

Timeline
Published
unknown
Last Modified
unknown
CVSS Details

CVSS details not available.

Affected Products

No product information available.

Weaknesses (CWE)
References
Linked Vulnerabilities

No linked vulnerabilities found.

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "source": "https://github.com/github/advisory-database/blob/main/advisories/github-reviewed/2026/07/GHSA-c8jx-96c9-8xrp/GHSA-c8jx-96c9-8xrp.json"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "crates.io",
        "name": "surrealdb",
        "purl": "pkg:cargo/surrealdb"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "3.1.0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "SEMVER"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-63742"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-863"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-07-01T20:22:06Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "A record user could learn the value of a hidden field by counting how many records match a guess.\n\nWhen `DEFINE FIELD ... PERMISSIONS FOR select WHERE ...` hides a field's contents from a caller, and that field is indexed, running `SELECT count() FROM t WHERE hidden_field = \"guess\" GROUP ALL` returned a count greater than zero whenever a record actually had that value — even though the caller was never allowed to read the field directly. The query planner used an indexed-COUNT shortcut (`Index::Count`, `IndexCountScan`, or the legacy `Iterate Index Count` / `Iterate Index Keys` paths) that counts matching index entries and skips the permission check that would normally hide the value. The same query with `WITH NOINDEX` correctly returned `[]`, confirming the gap.\n\nBy repeating the count query with different guesses, an attacker can confirm or recover the contents of any restricted field they could not read through a normal `SELECT`.\n\n### Impact\n\nWhat an attacker **can** do:\n\n- Confirm or recover values of a field protected by field-level SELECT permissions on any table they hold table-level SELECT on, provided the field is indexed.\n- Repeat the query with different guesses to read restricted field contents one value at a time.\n\nWhat it **can't** do:\n\n- Read fields that are not indexed (the shortcut only fires when an index covers the predicate column).\n- Cross table, database or namespace isolation boundaries.\n- Modify data, escalate privileges, or affect availability.\n\n### Patches\n\nThe legacy planner (`surrealdb/core/src/idx/planner/tree.rs`) and the streaming planner (`surrealdb/core/src/exec/planner/select/mod.rs`) now both refuse the indexed fast path when the WHERE / ORDER tree references a field governed by a non-`Full` SELECT permission:\n\n- `resolve_indexes` skips any B-tree / unique index whose columns are governed by such a permission.\n- A new `cond_touches_restricted_field` flag is propagated; `eval_count` refuses a dedicated `Index::Count` when set.\n- The streaming planner adds `cond_touches_restricted_select_field`, a `RestrictedIdiomChecker` visitor that matches each idiom against the table's field-permission prefixes (loaded via the plan-time txn), and gates `IndexCountScan` emission on it.\n- The fast paths are preserved for root / owner sessions via `should_check_perms_for_view`.\n\nVersions 3.1.0 and later are not affected.\n\n### Workarounds\n\nUsers unable to patch are advised to consider the following workarounds:\n\n- Avoid `DEFINE INDEX` on fields whose values are protected by field-level SELECT permissions. The class of attack is specific to the indexed fast paths.\n- Restrict the ability of record users to issue arbitrary `SELECT count() … GROUP ALL` queries against tables containing field-protected columns.\n- Use namespace / database isolation as the primary boundary where feasible.",
  "id": "GHSA-c8jx-96c9-8xrp",
  "modified": "2026-11-04T02:56:13.128405465Z",
  "published": "2026-07-01T20:22:06Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/surrealdb/surrealdb/security/advisories/GHSA-c8jx-96c9-8xrp"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/surrealdb/surrealdb/pull/240"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/surrealdb/surrealdb/commit/0c6dd021bb55b32a78a553c72bb9c0cdd414825f"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/surrealdb/surrealdb"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.9.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "SurrealDB: Field-level SELECT permissions bypassed via indexed COUNT fast paths"
}
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