rustsec-2026-0430

CVSS 4.7 osv_rustsec
Description

The Kitty graphics protocol handler in `rio-vt` builds a filesystem path from an attacker-controlled APC escape sequence and, for the temp-file medium, only checks that the path *contains the substring* `"tty-graphics-protocol"` before it opens, reads, and `remove_file`s it. There is no `..` rejection and no canonicalization, so a path containing the marker substring plus `..` escapes the terminal's temp directory (path traversal, CWE-22/CWE-23). Because a terminal renders whatever arrives on the PTY (ssh output, a `cat`'d file, CI logs), untrusted output can delete a file outside the temp area and cause its bytes to be read back in. ## Details The sink is `create_graphic_data()` in `src/ansi/kitty_graphics_protocol.rs`, in the `TransmissionMedium::TempFile` branch, reachable through the public API `rio_vt::ansi::kitty_graphics_protocol::parse`. The path is the base64 APC payload of an `a=t,t=t` command, and the guard is: ```rust let path = Path::new(path_str); if !path.is_file() { return Err(GraphicError::FileNotFound); } // literal path, resolves `..` // reject /proc/ /sys/ /dev/ (lowercased substring) if cmd.medium == TransmissionMedium::TempFile && !path_str.contains("tty-graphics-protocol") { // SUBSTRING, not a component return Err(GraphicError::InvalidData); } // ... let mut file = File::open(path)...; // reads file bytes if cmd.medium == TransmissionMedium::TempFile { let _ = std::fs::remove_file(path); // deletes the file } ``` This affects any terminal emulator or application built on `rio-vt` (e.g. the Rio terminal) that renders attacker-influenced output: an out-of-bounds file is deleted, and its contents are read into the process. ## The fix Fixed in `rio-vt` 0.5.29 (Rio 0.5.29) by [PR #1998](https://github.com/raphamorim/rio/pull/1998). For the temp-file medium the parent directory is resolved with `canonicalize` before any check, the resolved entry must lie inside a temp directory (`temp_dir()`, `/tmp` or `/dev/shm`) and contain the marker, and the delete goes through `unlinkat` on a handle to the validated directory, so neither `..` nor a swapped symlink can redirect it. Path checks for the file medium also run on the file actually opened.

Timeline
Published
unknown
Last Modified
unknown
CVSS Details

CVSS details not available.

Affected Products

No product information available.

References
Linked Vulnerabilities

No linked vulnerabilities found.

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "categories": [
          "file-disclosure"
        ],
        "cvss": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N",
        "informational": null,
        "source": "https://github.com/rustsec/advisory-db/blob/osv/crates/RUSTSEC-2026-0430.json"
      },
      "ecosystem_specific": {
        "affected_functions": null,
        "affects": {
          "arch": [],
          "functions": [
            "rio_vt::ansi::kitty_graphics_protocol::parse"
          ],
          "os": []
        }
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "crates.io",
        "name": "rio-vt",
        "purl": "pkg:cargo/rio-vt"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0.0.0-0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "0.5.29"
            }
          ],
          "type": "SEMVER"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "license": "CC0-1.0"
  },
  "details": "The Kitty graphics protocol handler in `rio-vt` builds a filesystem path from an attacker-controlled APC escape sequence and, for the temp-file medium, only checks that the path *contains the substring* `\"tty-graphics-protocol\"` before it opens, reads, and `remove_file`s it. There is no `..` rejection and no canonicalization, so a path containing the marker substring plus `..` escapes the terminal's temp directory (path traversal, CWE-22/CWE-23).\n\nBecause a terminal renders whatever arrives on the PTY (ssh output, a `cat`'d file, CI logs), untrusted output can delete a file outside the temp area and cause its bytes to be read back in.\n\n## Details\n\nThe sink is `create_graphic_data()` in `src/ansi/kitty_graphics_protocol.rs`, in the `TransmissionMedium::TempFile` branch, reachable through the public API `rio_vt::ansi::kitty_graphics_protocol::parse`. The path is the base64 APC payload of an `a=t,t=t` command, and the guard is:\n\n```rust\nlet path = Path::new(path_str);\nif !path.is_file() { return Err(GraphicError::FileNotFound); }       // literal path, resolves `..`\n// reject /proc/ /sys/ /dev/ (lowercased substring)\nif cmd.medium == TransmissionMedium::TempFile\n    && !path_str.contains(\"tty-graphics-protocol\") {                 // SUBSTRING, not a component\n    return Err(GraphicError::InvalidData);\n}\n// ...\nlet mut file = File::open(path)...;          // reads file bytes\nif cmd.medium == TransmissionMedium::TempFile {\n    let _ = std::fs::remove_file(path);      // deletes the file\n}\n```\n\nThis affects any terminal emulator or application built on `rio-vt` (e.g. the Rio terminal) that renders attacker-influenced output: an out-of-bounds file is deleted, and its contents are read into the process.\n\n## The fix\n\nFixed in `rio-vt` 0.5.29 (Rio 0.5.29) by [PR #1998](https://github.com/raphamorim/rio/pull/1998). For the temp-file medium the parent directory is resolved with `canonicalize` before any check, the resolved entry must lie inside a temp directory (`temp_dir()`, `/tmp` or `/dev/shm`) and contain the marker, and the delete goes through `unlinkat` on a handle to the validated directory, so neither `..` nor a swapped symlink can redirect it. Path checks for the file medium also run on the file actually opened.",
  "id": "RUSTSEC-2026-0430",
  "modified": "2026-11-02T11:00:02.247101984Z",
  "published": "2026-11-01T12:00:00Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://crates.io/crates/rio-vt"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://rustsec.org/advisories/RUSTSEC-2026-0430.html"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://github.com/raphamorim/rio/security/advisories/GHSA-m926-9wrf-jr8w"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/raphamorim/rio/pull/1998"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.9.2",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Path traversal in `rio-vt` Kitty graphics protocol handler allows out-of-bounds file delete (and read)"
}
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